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8.1  Introduction 
The past five years have witnessed a revival of interest in the relation 
between public sector deficits and the real rate of interest, spawning a 
literature that is already too large to adequately discuss it here. Much 
of the renewed interest was triggered by the striking differences in real 
interest rate response after the oil price shocks in 1973-74  (OPEC =  1) 
and those in 1979-80 (OPEC =  2). The question addressed in this paper 
is whether real interest patterns  since 1979 can be explained by  the 
changes in fiscal policy in the major industrial countries since 1979. 
After OPEC-1, real interest rates fell dramatically and remained low, 
often even negative, until the end of the 1970s (see fig. 8.1 in sec. 8.5). 
Many observers see OPEC-1 as a major explanatory factor behind this 
period of low real interest rates (see, e.g., Bruno and Sachs 1985). The 
oil price  shock in  1973-74,  so  this argument  goes, effected  a huge 
transfer of real income from low-saving oil-exporting countries in the 
Middle East. This increased world savings and led to an ex ante world 
current account surplus. To  restore global equilibrium and bring the 
world current account to zero, real interest rates fell. 
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Such a fall in real interest rates did not materialize after the second 
series of oil price shocks in 1979-80. Instead, real interest rates reached 
historical highs right through  1984, as nominal rates failed to decline 
in line with the substantial decline in inflation. Much of the subsequent 
discussion  has focused on whether the monetary and fiscal policies 
followed in the major industrial countries were to blame for this failure 
of  real interest rates to decline after OPEC-2 the way they did after 
We  will not be concerned with monetary policy; while some of  the 
developments since 1979 can be explained by the changes in monetary 
policy that were enacted in, mainly, the United States and Britain, it 
is impossible to use monetary policy as the dominant explanation of 
real interest rates in the 1980s. Blanchard and Dornbusch (1984) have 
argued this forcefully by  pointing out that the steepening of  the term 
structure and the sheer persistence of high real rates argue against such 
a purely monetary explanation. Fiscal deficits will  need to be consid- 
ered, and that is the main focus of this paper. 
The theoretical literature on  interest  rate effects of  public  sector 
deficits and the related issue of debt neutrality goes back a long time, 
of course, but it received a new impetus with the influential contribution 
by Barro (1974). Barro pointed out that private intergenerational trans- 
fers can compensate for government-induced intergenerational trans- 
fers and so leave the welfare of current and future generations unaf- 
fected by changes in public sector deficits. Under the conditions outlined 
in that article, substitution between current and future taxes will leave 
expenditure patterns unaffected. One needs many restrictive assump- 
tions for such savings behavior to emerge, as noted by Barro himself. 
The empirical evidence seems mixed at best (see Kormendi 1983, Ko- 
skela and Viren 1983, Seater and Mariano  1985, and van Wijnbergen 
1985a). This paper builds on the results of van Wijnbergen (1985a) that 
do not support debt neutrality (see also sec. 8.3.1). 
Without debt neutrality, the international repercussions of fiscal def- 
icits cannot be ignored. The recent debt-servicing problems of many 
developing countries have brought home the importance of  world in- 
terest rates to debtors of  less developed  countries  (LDC): a  1 per- 
centage point increase in world interest rates costs LDC debtors US 
$2.7 billion initially, an income loss that climbs to no less than 8 billion 
within five years. For comparison, this is almost one-third of the total 
OECD development aid in 1984 (van Wijnbergen 1985a). 
Nevertheless, not much has been done to assess the quantitative 
impact of  fiscal policies in the OECD on world interest rates and on 
the terms of trade between different regions of the world. Most of the 
attempts are in a closed-economy framework and take an unstructured 
reduced-form approach (a careful exercise along these lines is Mueller 
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and Price  1984). However, recent theoretical literature strongly sug- 
gests that a global general-equilibrium framework is more appropriate 
(Buiter 1984, Frenkel and Razin 1985a,b, Persson and Svensson 1985, 
van Wijnbergen 1985b). This is because international asymmetries in 
intertemporal and intratemporal expenditure patterns and initial debt 
positions are important determinants of the size and direction of relative 
price and real interest rate response to fiscal policy changes. 
In  this  paper I report  on an attempt  to apply  such a framework 
empirically. Savings and investment,  and the associated current ac- 
count imbalances, are interpreted as manifestations of  intertemporal 
trade. In the empirical analysis, I have therefore looked for respon- 
siveness of  intertemporal trade patterns to intertemporal prices (real 
interest rates) in addition to the more traditional intratemporal relative 
prices and income levels. This is a significant departure from the ex- 
isting empirical literature, where current account behavior is typically 
analyzed as a function of intratemporal variables only. At the core of 
the analysis is a careful study of private and public savings interaction 
in the industrial countries, while the global repercussions of fiscal pol- 
icies are traced  using a full multicountry  global general-equilibrium 
approach. The explicit attention to supply-side considerations, to the 
aggregate supply response  to relative  price  changes and changes in 
factor supplies, is another major departure from the existing literature 
on empirical macromodels. 
In many ways this attempt is as yet rudimentary. I do not attempt 
to estimate the structure of  intertemporal  preferences  directly (see 
Mankiw, Rothenberg,  and  Summers  1983 for such  an attempt in  a 
closed-economy framework). Instead,  I  test  the actual savings and 
current account response to changes in relative prices,  real interest 
rates, and contemporaneous income levels directly. This procedure is, 
of course, open to the Lucas-critique (Lucas 1976) that such response 
patterns might themselves change when policy changes. Further work 
is obviously needed, although uncertainty about whether policy shifts 
are temporary or permanent surely introduces  some sluggishness in 
such behavioral changes. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The theoretical 
structure of the model is presented in section 8.2. In section 8.3 I discuss 
the empirical results of two tests for debt neutrality suggested by the 
theory of section 8.2. Both strongly reject debt neutrality. The empirical 
estimation results are discussed in  section 8.4. Section 8.5 analyzes 
the impact of observed changes in fiscal policy on world interest rates 
over the period  1979-84.  Finally, section 8.6 discusses a specific ap- 
plication of a recent proposal to close U.S. fiscal deficits through trade 
taxes (an across-the-board import surcharge). Here we demonstrate 
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intratemporal trade and intertemporal relative prices: protectionism is 
shown to have significant consequences not only for the intratemporal 
terms of trade but also for the intertemporal terms of trade (real interest 
rates).  Van  Wijnbergen (1984) also raises  this  issue  in  a theoretical 
context; here I show its empirical relevance. Trade intervention di- 
rected against LDCs exacerbates the transfer problem they face and, 
the empirical analysis shows, deteriorates their external balance more 
than it improves the current account in the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). The resulting global imbalance 
is resolved through higher world interest rates, which puts an additional 
burden on LDCs. Section 8.7 concludes. 
8.2  Theoretical Structure of the Model 
This section presents the theoretical  structure underlying the em- 
pirical model. The structure of the model is similar to the one outlined 
in Marion and Svensson (1983), while the treatment of the interaction 
between private and foreign savings follows Blanchard (1985). Several 
concepts from the duality theory are used; a good reference is Dixit 
and Norman (1980). In particular, I use the revenue function, which 
gives the maximum value added that can be obtained from given factor 
supplies at given relative prices. I denote this function by R for current 
and r for future revenue. (In general, I will use capital letters for current 
variables and lower-case letters for future variables.) 
Similarly, the expenditure function E gives the minimum discounted 
value of  expenditure E needed to achieve welfare level  U  at given 
relative prices. The derivative of E with respect to any price yields the 
(Hicksian) demand for the corresponding good. 
P (p) is the relative price of  OECD goods in terms of LDC goods 
today (in the future). This corresponds to RPOE (see appendix for list 
of variable definitions) in section 8.3. Q (4)  is the current (future) oil 
price in  terms of  LDC goods; 8 is the world  discount factor where 
8 = 1/(1+  p);  p is the real own rate of interest on OECD goods (RROE 
in sec. 8.3 and 8.4); W is the real product wage in terms of LDC goods; 
while II (T)  is a true consumption price index. Other symbols are self- 
explanatory. 
Finally, variables without asterisk or superscript “0” refer to the 
OECD (like R); asterisks refer to LDCs (like R*),  and a superscript 
“o” (like R”) refers to OPEC, In the theory model, I ignore foreign 
assetddebt inherited from  “period  zero”; the empirical analysis, of 
course, incorporates beginning-of-period foreign debts or assets. 
8.2.1  The OECD Block 
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(1)  Y = Rp 
= Y(P,  Q; K,  L) 
=  Y(  1, QIP; K,  L). 
This is the equation estimated below. Labor used (L) is determined 
by equalizing the real product wage to the marginal product of labor: 
(2)  RL = W, 
or 
(2a) 
In a CES world it is possible to write equation (2a) as 
L  = L(WlP, QIP; K). 
(2b)  L = L(W/P, Y) 
Finally, oil demand Z can also be derived from the revenue function: 
(3)  2 =  -RQ. 
The more interesting part is on the private consumption side. I follow 
Blanchard (1985) in identifying a difference between private and gov- 
ernment discount factors as a source of breakdown for debt neutrality. 
This lends itself to a very simple empirical test. 
First, some arithmetic: Define 6 as the government’s discount factor, 
equal to over one plus the world interest rate, and 6 as the private 
discount factor. Then the perceived current and future tax burden equals 
(4)  T + 6t = T + 6t + (6 - 6)t. 
Now the government budget constraint tells us 
(5) 
substituting equation (5) into equation (4)  leads to 
G + Sg  = T + 6t; 
(6)  T + 6t= G + 6g + (6 - 6)t 
= G + 6g + (6 - 6) (t -  g) 
(6 - 6) 
=G+&g+-  (G - T).  6 
The private budget constraint then becomes: 
(7)  R  + br -  PI - T - 6t = E(II,  6~,  u), 
which, after substituting in equation (6), becomes 
(6 -  6) 
R - G + 6(r -  g) -  PI  + -  (G - T)  6 278  Sweder van Wijnbergen 
This has two testable implications: one for private consumption, and 
one for the current account. First, private consumption. Current real 
consumptions equals 
(9)  El, = CIE(k)  [R -  G + b(r -  g) -  PI+ (6 -  ')(G - 711 
This is the equation in section 8.3 where we approximate R - G + 6 
(r -  g) -  PI by applying a Koyck lag to R -  G in the way advocated 
by  Friedman  (1951). CIE  is the marginal propensity to spend out of 
wealth in period  1. 
The second test occurs in the current account (CA) equation, which 
is an alternative for an investment equation given income and con- 
sumption. The CA equals: 
(10)  CA = R - G -  EJ  -  PI 
= (R - G)(1 -  C,E) - C~E~(T  -  g) 
(6 - 6) 
-  (1 - C,E)PI -  ClE7  (G - T). 
Equation (10)  shows that  changes in government expenditure when 
considered permanent will not influence the CA  if(1 -  CIE)dG  = CIEdg, 
which will hold if  expenditure shares per unit of time are equal over 
time. It also shows that a change in deficit in the CA  equation therefore 
also allows for a test of debt neutrality. The empirical results for these 
two tests, both of which reject debt neutrality, are discussed in section 
8.3. 
In the empirical model,  T is actually a function of other variables 
(income and consumption) in an attempt to capture both indirect and 
direct sources of  tax revenues. 
Finally, demand  for OECD goods is assumed to depend on total 
expenditure and relative prices, in standard budget allocation fashion. 
The OECD block is rounded out by the dynamic accumulation iden- 
tities listed at the end of section 8.3. 
8.2.2  LDC Block 
Contrary to the OECD block, capital goods are imported by the LDC 
block (from the OECD) rather than produced at home. Also, largely 
because of data limitations, no distinction is made between the public 
and private sector. 
The national budget constraint becomes: 
(1  1)  ~*(i,  Q;  K,  L) + tir*(i,  4;  k) - pr 
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which yields LDC welfare U*  as a function of current and future relative 
prices and the world discount factor. Of special interest is the welfare 
effect of terms of trade changes: 
dU* 
dP  F, -  = -  (I'  + q). 
Note that terms involving rlc and r,,  drop out via intertemporal pro- 
duction efficiency (Sri = p). 
The current account equals 
(13)  CA* = R* -  PI'  -  EnII 
plus interest payments if  initial debt is not zero.  The WISH utility 
structure (see Razin and Svensson  1983)  assumed here allows us to 
write real consumption expenditure as a function of the LDC consumer 
discount factor and welfare: 
= En(l, g,  U8)  . 
Equation (14) clearly is a function of relative prices and welfare which, 
by  substituting in  the indirect  utility function,  can  be  written  as  a 
function of relative prices and wealth. In our empirical consumption 
function, we will proxy wealth by a Koyck-lag applied to current in- 
come to derive permanent income in the way suggested by Friedman 
(1951). LDC imports of final consumption goods from the OECD de- 
pend on total real consumption expenditure in the period Eln and rel- 
ative prices: 
(15)  Fp = EnIIp. 
The most interesting derivative of equation (13) concerns the terms 
of trade; a permanent term of trade shock dP = Sdp has the following 
effect on the CA: 
(16)  CA; dP + CA; Sdp =  -(1  -  C;E)Ep dP + CiEq  Sdp 
where C;, is the share of  wealth  spent on period  one goods. With 
sufficient symmetry over time,  the  first two terms cancel (see van 
Wijnbergen  1984  for a more  careful statement).  This opens up the 
possibility of a negative CA response in the LDCs to an increase in the 
relative  price of  OECD goods (de dp > 0),  even though  the utility 
structure assumed rules out Harberger-Laursen-Metzler  terms of trade 
effects on savings. The effect comes via investment, however; if  in- 
vestment is sufficiently inelastic (Z,  small enough), the term (1 - G,)Z 
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be even stronger if the shock is temporary, since then the positive term 
(C;,E,Gdp)  will drop out. This negative effect is confirmed in the em- 
pirical analysis and drives much of the results on the real interest rate 
effect of protectionism. The rest of the LDC block is straightforward. 
Equation (14) gives real consumption, so investment can be derived 
from equations (14) and (16), the CA  identity, and real income. 
It remains to fill out the supply side of the economy. Aggregate supply 
of LDC goods equals the derivative of the revenue function with respect 
to its output price by  simple property of  the revenue function (Dixit 
and Norman 1980): 
(17)  Y'  = R; = Y(1, Q;  K,  L). 
Data problems do not allow us to estimate output as a function of 
factor supplies K and L and relative prices; I have an estimate of K 
constructed from investment flows using the perpetual inventory method 
and a 5% depreciation rate. No observations on labor use are available, 
however. To get around this problem we simply assume a minimum 
real consumption  wage, which provides a link between  the terms of 
trade and the real product wage relevant for employment conditions: 
--  W  - y = > W = -*P. 
WP, 1) 
This can be substituted into a labor demand function that is defined 
implicitly by the requirement that the marginal value of labor equals 
the real product wage: RL  = W*. If that is inserted into equation (17), 
we get the aggregate supply function that I estimated empirically: 
The block is completed by dynamic equations linking current and 
future capital, depreciation and investment, and an equation linking 
current and future foreign debt and the current account (see sec. 8.3). 
8.2.3  OPEC Block 
The OPEC block is simplified a great deal by not endogenizing the 
process OPEC uses to set the relative price of oil in terms of  OECD 
goods, Q = Q/P (for a similar model where the price is  endogenized, 
incorporating exhaustibility of oil, see van Wijnbergen 198%). OPEC 
income  Yo  then is simply the oil price times OECD- and LDC-derived 
demand for oil, 2 and T,  plus their income from foreign assets. Ex- 
penditure is once again summarized by an expenditure function, so the 
intertemporal budget constraint becomes 
(19)  (z* + Z)Q + (z + z')Gq  = E"[lI(P,l), h(p,l),  U"]. 281  Fiscal Policy, Trade Intervention,  and World Interest Rates 
The current account equals 
(20)  CAI  = Yo  -  EEII, 
which will be a function of relative prices and current and expected 
oil income. 
Expenditure then follows from the current account identity linking 
income, expenditure, and the current account. The final equation links 
expenditure  on  OECD  goods  to  relative  prices  and  aggregate 
expenditure: 
(21)  E$  = Ef, IIg . 
Finally, the current account equals changes in net foreign assets. 
8.2.4  Closing the Model 
What  remains are the two market clearing equations tying down 
relative prices P and 6( =  1[1  + p]), where 6 is the own rate of interest 
on OECD commodities. 
The first is the OECD commodity market clearing equation: 
(22)  Y(Q, WIP, K)  = Ep + Eg  + Eg + I  + I'. 
The second is a market clearing equation for future goods which, 
via the intertemporal budget constraint, can be transformed into an 
equation requiring the world current account to be zero: 
(23) 
The empirical problems of assessing expectations of future terms of 
trade changes dp is resolved, following Marion and Svensson (1983), 
by simply assuming that future foreign and domestic goods are perfect 
substitutes so that p  becomes exogenous and future foreign and do- 
mestic goods can be aggregated into one commodity, future goods. 
CA + CA'  + CA" = 0. 
8.3  Two Tests for Debt Neutrality 
The theoretical structure of section 8.2 suggests two tests of  non- 
neutrality. The first involves private savings behavior directly, the sec- 
ond concerns the current account (see eqs. [9] and [lo] in sec. 8.2). 
Consider first private savings. 
The theoretical  analysis of  section 8.2 suggests  that  the  relevant 
measure of disposable income is income minus government expendi- 
ture, not income minus taxes. If  private and social discount factors 
differ (following Blanchard 1985), fiscal deficits will have an additional 
influence on private consumption, the coefficient of which will be pro- 
portional to that discount factor difference. That suggests estimation 
of the following equation: 282  Sweder van Wijnbergen 
CPROE = U,  + uIRROE + az(Y -  GROE) 
+ u,(GROE - TROE), 
where  Y is net national income; GROE is real government expenditure 
(minus inflationary erosion of the public debt and minus transfer pay- 
ments that we interpret as negative taxes); and TROE is real govern- 
ment revenue minus transfer payments. 
Debt neutrality implies u3 = 0, and no debt neutrality implies u3 > 0: 
(Note that  equation  [9]  suggests  that  there  is  no presumption  that 
u3 = u2,  not even without debt neutrality; Y-TROE would, therefore, 
be the appropriate definition of disposable income by a fluke only.) 
When I run this equation on OECD aggregates, I get: 
CPROE = -  109. + 435. RROE  + 0.58 (Y - GROE) 
(2.56)  (0.80)  (6.88) 
(6.99)  (3.38) 
+ 0.62 (GROE -  TROE) + 0.33  x  CPROE( -  1) 
(1966- 1983, 2SLS) 
The coefficient on the deficit is very significantly different from zero 
(t-statistic of 6.99!). Therefore our test strongly supports the crowding 
out  hypothesis  and  rejects  the  no  crowding  out,  debt  neutrality 
hypothesis. 
The second test involves the current account equation. Equation (10) 
in section 8.2 suggests that the CA should depend on disposable income 
Y - GROE and various intratemporal and intertemporal relative prices 
(through CIE  and PI, cf. eq. [lo]). However, government deficits, for 
a given level of government expenditure, enter only if debt neutrality 
fails to hold, if  6 # 6: 
CAROE =  63.6  +  375.3 RPOET - 152.9 RPOILT 
(0.88)  (1.92)  (3.36) 
(2.15)  (2.53) 
+ 0.045 (Y -  GROE)  -  0.18 (GROE -  TROE) 
(1966-1983,  2SLS, 6 = 0.5). 
The empirical results for this equation also strongly reject debt neu- 
trality. The coefficient on government deficits is highly  significantly 
different from zero and of the “right”  sign. 
8.4  Estimation Results 
model presented in section 8.2. 
This section reports on the results obtained when  estimating the 283  Fiscal Policy, Trade Intervention, and World Interest Rates 
8.4.1  OECD Block 
Aggregate Demand 
In  section 8.2.1 we  provided evidence against the debt neutrality 
hypothesis and in favor of the traditional tax-based definition of private 
disposable income. This leads to: 
CPROE = -51.8  + 0.36 (Y -  TROE) + 0.59 CPROE( -  1) 
(1.30)  (6.33)  (9.04) 
(R2  = 0.99, 1966-1983,  2SLS), 
where Y equals net national income minus inflationary erosion of public 
debt. 
The second important equation is a current account equation (we 
could alternatively have estimated an investment equation): 
(0.88)  (1.92)  (3.36) 
(2.15)  (2.53) 
CAROE = -  63.6  +  375.3 RROET - 152.9 RPOILT 
+ 0.045 (Y -  GROE)  -  0.18 (GROE - TROE) 
(1966-1983,  2SLS, 6 = 0.5). 
The positive interest effect should not be surprising. Notice also the 
strongly significant negative effect of government deficits (GROE - 
TROE). This provides additional evidence against the debt neutrality 
hypothesis. Finally the negative oil price and positive disposable in- 
come effects also conform to prior expectations. 
For  given  value  of  real  GDP  (GDPROE =  YROE - 
OILROE'RPOIL,  output minus imported oil), investment can be de- 
termined from the CA identity: 
IROE = GDPROE + RROE  x  NFAROE( -  1) 
- CPROE - GRCOE -  CAROE, 
where GRCOE is real government consumption. 
allocated over domestic (ADROE) and LDC goods: 
Aggregate expenditure ATROE (= CPROE + GRCOE + IROE) is 
log ADROE  = 0.05  +  0.99 log ATROE  + 0.01 log RPOE 
(4.83)  (76.8)  (4.33) 
(R2 = 0.99,  1966-1983,  2SLS). 
This equation implies a pure own price elasticity of demand of -  0.99 
(ADROE and ATROE are both deflated by the price of OECD goods!). 
Of  more interest is the implied income elasticity of demand for LDC 
exports, which is 1.6, considerably below the value used in, for ex- 
ample, Cline (1984). 284  Sweder van Wijnbergen 
Aggregate Supply 
First is the labor demand equation, linking changes in unemployment 
rates, itself expressed in percentage points, to changes in real product 
wages and changes in real output: 
UOE = UOE( -  1) + 0.84  + 19.3 [log WROE - log WROE( -  l)] 
(3.82)  (1.61) 
- 31.5 [log YROE - log YROE(-  l)] 
(5.52) 
(R2=  0.96, 1969-1983, 2SLS). 
Changes in  output are linked to (percentage) changes in  labor use 
(approximated by minus changes in the unemployment rate), changes 
in the beginning of period capital stock, and changes in the real product 
price of oil: 
log YROE = log YROE( -  1) + 0.03 - 0.03 [UOE - UOE(-  1) 
(1.45)  (6.08) 
+ 0.34 [log KROE( -  1) - log KROE( -  2)] 
(0.50) 
(1.67) 
-  O.O2[10g  RPOIL -  log RPOIL( -  I)] 
(R2=  0.99, 1969-1983,  2SLS). 
The coefficient on unemployment  changes  (which is  in  percentage 
points), is clearly incompatible with the underlying production function 
framework. The simulations were performed using what the value the- 
ory suggests: (1 - .34)/100. 
The within-period part of this block is rounded out by econometric 
equations linking capital depreciation CKPOE to the beginning of pe- 
riod capital stock, real tax revenues to consumption and income, and 
real oil imports to the real product price of oil and real output: 
CKPOE =  -201  + 0.05 KROE( -  1) 
(12.2)  (49.3) 
(R2 = 0.99, 1966-1983). 
TROE = 591  + 0.34 CPROE(-  1) + 0.25 YROE 
(14.3) (4.04)  (4.63) 
(R2  = 0.99, 1966-1983). 
log(OILR0E) = log[OILROE( -  l)] - 12.1 
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-  0.06 T - 0.16[10g  RPOIL -  log RPOIL( -  l)] 
(2.66)  (2.46) 
+ 3.53 log YROE -  2.06 log YROE( -  1) 
(3.93)  (1.80) 
(R2  = 0.97, 2SLS, 1966-1983). 
Finally, dynamic equations link current and future asset stocks via 
physical investment, current account deficits, and fiscal deficits: 
KROE = KROE (-1)  -  CKROE + IROE, 
NFAROE = NFAROE(-  1)  + CAROE, 
DBTROE  = DBTROE (- 1) -  NLROE. 
8.4.2  OPEC Block 
The OPEC block is very much simplified. OPEC sets the real price 
of oil in terms of OECD goods, RPOIL, which is therefore considered 
exogenous. It then supplies all the oil demanded by OECD and LDC 
at that price.  Its total income equals oil imports times the oil price, 
plus earnings on foreign assets: 
YROPEC  = (OILROE + OILRLDC) RPOIL 
+ NFAROPEC( -  1) RROE. 
For a given income we obtain expenditure via a CA equation, using 
the identity that income minus expenditure equals the current account. 
The CA equation is: 
CAROPEC =  -7.2  + 348. RROE 
(0.51) (2.84) 
+ 0.61 YROPEC - 129. RPOIL (- 1) 
(6.93)  (6.30) 
(R2  = 0.86, 1966-1983,  2SLS, 6 = 0.58). 
Once again we get a strong positive interest rate effect; OPEC, of 
course, is also a net creditor. OPEC saves a very high proportion of 
current income, but the negative term on lugged oil prices indicates a 
strong catching-up effect on expenditure. 
Total expenditure ATROPEC can be obtained from the value of in- 
come and the current account identity: 
ATROPEC  = YROPEC - CAROPEC. 
Finally OPECs demand for OECD goods is a function of total ex- 
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log (ADROPEC) = 0.39 -t  0.78 log (ATROPEC) 
(1.18) (11.4) 
-  1.7 1 log (RPOE) 
(2.53) 
(R2  = 0.91, 1969-1983,  2SLS, (i = 0.64). 
and the beginning and end of period net foreign assets: 
The only intertemporal link in this block is via the current account 
NFAROPEC  = NFAROPEC( -  1)  + CAROPEC. 
8.4.3  LDC Block 
prices, the terms of trade, and physical capital. 
Aggregate supply  (total output) in  LDCs is  a function  of  real oil 
log (YRLDC) - log [KRLDC(-  l)] = - 1.18 + 0.016 t 
(10.5)  (2.54) 
- 0.10 log [RPOIL( -  1) * RPOE( -  l)] 
(2.47) 
-0.23  log RPOE 
(1.18) 
(R2  = 0.99, 1967-1983). 
The LDC output equation works remarkably well, with strong neg- 
ative effects of the (LDC) real product price of oil RPOIL * RPOE and 
strong positive  terms of  trade effects (i.e.,  RPOE comes in  with a 
negative coefficient). 
Aggregate expenditure can be derived from real income and the CA; 
the CA equations can be estimated as follows: 
CARLDC = 377. - 237. RRLDC  -303.  RPOE 
(2.38)  (2.96)  (2.73) 
- 74.3 RPOIL - 0.15 NFARLDC( -  1) 
(1.24)  (1.48) 
- 0.36 YRLDC( -  1)  + 0.05 YROE 
(1.79)  (1.16) 
(R2  = 0.94, 1966-1983, 2SLS, (i = 0.10). 
This time, interest rate effects are negative, which is no surprise: 
LDCs are large debtors. Total expenditure then equals: 
ATRLDC = YRLDC + RRLDC  x  NFARLDC(-  1) 
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LDC expenditure on OECD goods (ADRLDC)  depends on total LDC 
expenditure (ATRLDC) and relative prices: 
log (ADRLDC) = -2.79  + 1.05 log (ATRLDC) - 2.14 log(RP0E) 
(3.58)  (9.60)  (6.42) 
(R2  = 0.96, 1967-1983,  2SLS). 
Total (private and government; no breakdown is available) real con- 
sumption expenditure (CPRLDCT) depends on real output (YRLDC), 
the stock of  debt (= minus NFARLDC), and lagged consumption: 
CPRLDC = -134.9  + 0.58 YRLDCT 
(1.63) (3.87) 
+ 0.45 NFARLDC (- 1) + 0.63 CPRLDC( -  1) 
(2.17)  (2.88) 
(R2  = 0.98, 1967-1982,  2SLS). 
Gross investment then equals the difference between total expend- 
iture and real consumption: 
IRLDC = ATRLDC - CPRLDC. 
Finally, the dynamic equations: future net foreign assets equal cur- 
rent stocks and the CA: 
NFARLDC = NFARLDC( -  1) + CARLDC. 
Next period’s capital equals today’s beginning of  period stock plus 
gross investment minus depreciation. We  assumed depreciation to be 
equal to 5% of the capital stock each year. This leads to: 
KRLDC = 0.95 KRLDC( -  1) + IRLDC. 
8.4.4  Closing the Model 
The model  is  closed by  a world CA-equals-zero equation and an 
OECD commodity-market-clearing condition. These jointly determine 
the real interest rate WOE)  and the OECDlLDC terms of trade (RPOE). 
The world CA  equation states that the world current account has to 
equal zero: 
CAROE + CAROPEC + CARLDCMPOE  + CARDIS = 0. 
CARDIS is the world current account discrepancy, which is entered 
exogenously. 
OECD commodity market clearing implies: 
YROE  = ADROE  + ADROPEC  + ADRLDC. 
Walras’s  law  makes  the  LDC  commodity-market-clearing equation 
redundant. 288  Sweder van Wijnbergen 
8.5  Fiscal Policy in the OECD during 1979-84 
8.5.1  Historical Overview 
From reading professional and journalistic commentaries alike, one 
gets the impression of a near-consensus characterization of fiscal pol- 
icies in  the first five years of  this decade, with disagreements not on 
what happened but on what effect changes in fiscal policies had  on 
interest rates and so on. The 1980s are seen as a period of retrenchment 
or at least containment of  government expenditure, with imbalances 
triggered by the fact that tax cuts in the United States have eroded the 
revenue base more than warranted by the expenditure restraint actually 
achieved. Some observers claim that, OECD-wide, even that is not 
true; surpluses in Western Europe and Japan are claimed to have offset 
the increased deficits in the United States (Blanchard and Summers 
1984). I will argue here that that view is at variance with the facts and, 
by its exclusive  focus on public sector deficits,  misleading in its emphasis. 
Three measurement problems have, I think, clouded the discussion. 
First is, of  course, the issue of inflationary erosion  of  public sector 
debt. Second comes the problem of cyclical adjustment. And finally, 
and most importantly since generally ignored, the distinction between 
government expenditure on goods and services, on the one hand, and 
transfer payments, on the other. 
The importance of the first two issues is demonstrated in figure 8.1. 
When only real interest payments are included in government expend- 
91  I 
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Public sector surplus in the United Kingdom as a percentage 
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iture, the United Kingdom turns out to have run a public sector surplus 
throughout  most  of  the  past  15  years. Table  8.1  presents inflation- 
adjusted government balances as a share of national income for the 
major industrial countries. The figures confirm that the United States 
has seen by far the largest shift in public sector deficits, from a 3.6% 
surplus to a 2.7% deficit (all as a percentage of national income). How- 
ever, table 8.1 also documents an increase in  public sector deficits in 
the other eight major industrial economies, with reductions in Japan 
and West Germany too small to offset increases in Italy, France, the 
United  Kingdom, and, to a lesser extent, the smaller countries like 
Holland and Belgium. Overall the public sector deficit increased by 3 
percentage points of aggregate national income when the United States 
is included, and between 0.6 and 1.7 percentage points (depending on 
whether one starts from  1979 or 1980) when the United States is ex- 
cluded. Anyhow, there were no major fiscal improvements in the non- 
U.S. industrial countries. 
Cyclical correction presents a much more contentious issue. Cyclical 
correction is not really a problem in the United States or Japan, since 
unemployment in 1979 and 1984 was not that different in each country. 
It is, however, a major issue in Western Europe as figure 8.1 demon- 
strates for the United  Kingdom. Cyclical corrections like the one in 
figure 8.1  are behind  the Blanchard-Summers claim that fiscal con- 
traction in Western Europe has more or less offset fiscal expansion in 
the United States. 
However, in this paper I argue that fiscal deficits drive up real interest 
rates because imperfect private savings offsets would trigger an incip- 
ient, global, current account deficit at unchanged real interest rates. In 
that case, cyclically adjusted deficits are not a relevant measure. It is 
actual government dissaving that needs to be matched, not what gov- 
ernment dissavings would have been had other policies allowed a return 
to 1979 levels of unemployment. 
Finally, transfer payments. From a macroeconomic point of view, 
these are better seen as negative taxes rather than as a component of 
government expenditure.  If  one rearranges the numbers along those 
lines, a surprising picture emerges (fig. 8.2). In the nine major industrial 
economies, government revenues  net  of  outlays on  Social Security 
(OECD national account definitions) have remained constant as a share 
of national income throughout the past 20  years right up to 1984, at 
around 22%. The big increase in deficits is due to a substantial increase 
in government expenditure on goods and services; as a share of national 
income, government expenditure on goods and services increased by 
a full 3 percentage points. To  put that in perspective, to restore the 
1979 ratio in 1984, actual expenditure would need to be cut by no less 
than $220 billion; this corresponds to, for example, reducing the entire 
U.S. defense budget to zero in 1984. Table 8.1.  Inflation-Adjusted Government Budget Balance as a Percentage of  National Income in 
Selected Industrial Countries, 1%5-84 
Nine large 
industrial countries 
United  United  Including  Excluding 
Year  Kingdom  Germany  Italy  France  Japan  States  United States  United States 
1965-73  3.8 
1974-78  2.7 
1979  2.1 
1980  3.4 
1981  2.2 
1982  I .5 
1983  -  1.1 
I984  -0.3 
1 .o 
-  2.4 
-  1.9 
-2.1 
-  2.5 
-  1.9 
-  1.7 
-0.4 
-3.6  I .8  I .8  I .6  I  .5 
0.3  0.5  2.4  1 .o  0.1 
-0.7  0.8  -  4.4  3.6  0.7 
4.5  2.2  -  3.6  2.0  0.7 
2.0  0.5  -3.3  2.4  0.6 
-0.3  -0.4  -2.8  -2.0  -  1.6 
-0.4  -1.5  -3.4  -3.0  -2.7 
-4.7  -  1.9  -  1.7  -2.7  -  2.3 
1.4 
-  0.6 
-  1.3 
-  0.2 
-  0.8 
-  1.3 
-  2.4 
-  1.9 
Note: Negative sign indicates deficit. 
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In section 8.5.2, I will use the model outlined in sections 8.2 and 8.4 
to trace the consequences for global equilibrium of a counterfactual 
slowdown of government expenditure to half its historically observed 
pace. Section 8.6 is forward looking and deals with different ways of 
reducing existing fiscal deficits and their implications for world interest 
rates and terms of trade between different regions of the world. 
8.5.2  Looking Back: Global Economic Effects of  a Slowdown in 
Government Expenditure 
The experiment performed is a slowdown in government consump- 
tion that would half the increase in the share of  total government ex- 
penditure in national income between  1979 and 1984. This is, in fact, 
quite a dramatic cutback in real government expenditure starting at 
US$13.5 billion in 1980 and climbing to a cut of no less than US$109.5 
billion in  1984.  Not surprisingly, a real  shock of that magnitude has 
major implications for world interest rates and the distribution of cur- 
rent account imbalances. Figure 8.3 compares actual real interest rates 
with  what the model  predicts  would  have  happened  if  government 292  Sweder van Wijnbergen 
1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  -  Actuol  -  -  LWGOV.  EXD 
World Bank--30261:3 
Fig. 8.3  Own rate of  interest on OECD goods (real). Actual  (solid 
line) and simulated (dotted line) real interest rate; the sim- 
ulation  assumes reduced real government expenditure (see 
text). 
expenditure would have gone up only 1.5% of base run national income. 
The real rate concept used is the own rate of interest on OECD goods, 
here defined as LIBOR minus the GNP-weighted inflation rate in the 
dollar GNP deflator for the nine major OECD countries. 
Two things stand out in figure 8.3. First, it seems clear that fiscal 
policy changes and their impact on global current account equilibrium 
explain a negligible fraction of the rapid increase in real interest rates 
in  1979-82.  However, and this is the second point, from 1982 onward, 
almost all of the increase in real rates can be ascribed to the pressure 
on world savings exerted by increased fiscal expenditure and the fact 
that it was deficit financed. The fiscal cutback enacted in this run would 
have taken less than 1 percentage point out of real interest rates in 1980 
and  1981, almost  3 percentage  points in  1983, and  5  and  almost 7 
percentage points in  1983 and 1984, respectively. Total (real) interest 
cost on public debt throughout the OECD would have fallen by 1984. 
This provides additional effects on government deficits which, in the 
OECD as a whole, would decline by no less than  US$160 billion in 
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Because of reduced pressure on OECD commodities markets, the 
relative price of OECD goods in terms of LDC goods decline by about 
3 percentage points, implying a slightly larger drop in the own rate of 
interest on LDC goods than in the own rate of interest on OECD goods 
we just discussed. 
The biggest current account realignment would be from OPEC to- 
ward  the  LDCs.  The latter  would  run a substantially  lower  deficit 
because of the favorable terms of trade and real interest rate devel- 
opments. The difference starts at a small US$2 billion in 1980 but climbs 
to a US$22 billion improvement in  1984. As a result, the real value of 
LDC debt would be at US$824 billion at the end of  1984 rather than 
US$884 billion as it is in the base case. 
Lower real interest rates would, according to our simulation results, 
have increased investment in the LDCs by 13% in 1984, auguring well 
for future growth; in fact output in the LDCs would have been higher 
in 1984 already, by 3 percentage points. 
Much of the current debt crisis may be due to unsustainable policies 
in the  LDCs  themselves  before  1980. But  these  simulation  results 
strongly suggest that the current situation would be substantially more 
favorable for the developing countries had the OECD practiced more 
fiscal restraint in the mid- 1980s, with appropriate monetary policies in 
place to avoid Keynesian effective demand problems. 
8.6  Looking Ahead: Trade Taxes to Reduce Deficits 
In this section I discuss the global impact of intervention in com- 
modity trade in order to reduce public sector deficits. There is no need 
to discuss more direct measures, such as a cut in government expend- 
iture, since their effect can be deduced from the results of section 8.5. 
I will discuss a flat tariff of 10% on all final goods imports into the 
OECD. This measure is, of course, not a good simulation of the across- 
the-board  import tariff occasionally  discussed in the United  States, 
because intra-OECD trade is not captured in the model used here, and 
the volume of OECD trade with the non-oil developing countries is too 
small for tariffs on it to make much of a dent in  overall deficits. The 
reason to bring it up, nevertheless, is to draw attention to important 
interactions between intratemporal and intertemporal trade through the 
global terms of the trade effects such measures would have, interactions 
that have completely been left out of the discussion of these measures. 
I  will  show that these interactions are, in fact, very important:  the 
adverse terms of trade effects on the LDCs’ terms of trade exacerbate 
the transfer problem they face to such an extent that real interest rate 
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8.6.1  Protectionism, the Transfer Problem, and the 
Real Rate of  Interest 
This experiment is set up as follows: The model was first made to 
track a “central case” that underlies the global projections in the World 
Development Report 1985 (World Bank 1985). I then superimposed on 
that case an additional 10% tariff on OECD imports from the LDCs 
and solved the model for the general equilibrium response of real in- 
terest rates, terms of  trade, and so on. I ran two variants of  this ex- 
periment. In the first one the tariff revenues collected by the public 
sector are handed out to the private sector, with no direct effect on 
fiscal deficits. In the second one the revenues are used to reduce public 
sector deficits. 
This experiment would  constitute a very large increase in  tariffs, 
more than doubling the average tariff level LDCs are currently facing. 
On the other hand, there is congressional pressure in the United States 
for a 20% surcharge, while the European Economic Community would 
beyond doubt retaliate in kind if  that would, indeed, happen. The 10% 
tariff is, therefore, certainly within the realm of  the possible. 
Consider first the case where tariff revenues are handed out again 
rather than used to reduce public sector deficits. The empirical results 
indicate that a 10% tariff would largely be shifted forward toward LDC 
exporters rather than backward to the OECD consumers: the LDC 
terms of trade with respect to the OECD deteriorate with no less than 
7 percentage points, so 70% of  the tariff is shifted forward. This has, 
of course, strong effects on LDC exports: the average export volume 
growth rate over the five-year period is 3 percentage points below what 
it  would  have been without the tariff. Moreover, the model clearly 
demonstrates the export-tax equivalence of  import tariffs: OECD ex- 
port growth to LDCs fails by  no less than 4.6 percentage points on 
average over five years. This decline in OECD exports also explains 
the current account response patterns and real interest rate effects, to 
which we now turn. 
The most dramatic aspect of this simulation is the interest rate effect 
of such an increase in protectionism. The empirical evidence (see sec- 
tion 8.4) indicates no significant effect of the final goods terms of trade 
on the CA  in the OECD, but a significant final goods terms of  trade 
effect in LDCs; therefore, a terms of trade deterioration of the LDCs 
with respect to the OECD leads to an ex ante CA  deterioration in the 
LDCs but no symmetric improvement in the OECD. As a result, if  a 
big increase in tariffs in the OECD leads to a deterioration of the LDC/ 
OECD terms of  trade (which it  will  do at anything short of  100% 
backward shifting), there will  be  an ex  ante world current account 
deterioration, necessitating higher real interest rates to restore global 
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intervention: LDCs suffer twice. First, their static, intratemporal terms 
of  trade deteriorate; second, they will be  hit by  higher real interest 
rates, or, in other words, their intertemporal terms of trade deteriorate 
also. 
The numbers are substantial. The experiment we  performed is ad- 
mittedly a rather aggressive one: an across-the-board 10% import sur- 
charge directed against LDCs, imposed in  1985 and sustained through- 
out. The impact effect on real interest rates, via the asymmetry in CA 
response to terms of trade changes, is dramatic. Real interest rates rise 
no less than 2 percentage points in  the first year, and are still almost 
1% higher in  1989 (.7 percentage point). 
Moreover, this is the real rate in terms of  OECD commodities. The 
effect is even more dramatic when looked at  in terms of  the goods 
LDCs need to export to service their debt, because the LDC/OECD 
terms of  trade deteriorate steadily throughout the simulation period 
under this high protection scenario. Their own rate of interest on LDC 
goods shoots up with a full 5 percentage points in the first year of the 
import surcharge, and in  1989 it is still 1.3 percentage point higher than 
what it otherwise would have been. 
It should, finally, not come as a surprise that the high protectionism 
scenario has a major impact on LDC growth. The LDC growth rate 
falls to 3.5% on average over the next five years, down from a healthier 
5% in  the benchmark case, with more slowdown to come: LDC in- 
vestment in the final year, 1989, is only 84% of its “central case” value. 
Applying tariff revenues against public sector deficits rather than 
handing them out to OECD consumers moderates the upward pressure 
on interest rates to some extent (cf. fig. 8.4), but it does not otherwise 
affect the results a great deal. The tariff revenues start at about US$IO 
billion and increase to US$15 billion (in 1984 dollars) in 1989, reducing 
the increase in interest rates by about 0.5 percentage point each year, 
compared to the case where tariff revenues are handed out. This is not 
enough to reverse the increase in real interest rates. The negative terms 
of trade effect exacerbating the LDCs’ transfer problem dominates the 
deficit-reducing effect of  higher tariffs by  a wide margin (fig. 8.4). 
8.7  Conclusions 
In this paper I present a simple, global, theoretical, general-equilib- 
rium  model. The model is designed to discuss the global effects on 
intertemporal and intratemporal trade of various fiscal policy measures 
and  interventions in  commodity trade.  Moreover, it  has been  con- 
structed with empirical estimation in mind, so some effort has gone 
into avoiding clearly unobservable variables. 296  Sweder van Wijnbergen 
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Fig. 8.4  Own rate of interest on OECD goods (real). 
Effect of  10% tariff against LDC exports on world interest 
rates. 
The theoretical structure suggests two tests of debt neutrality, both 
of which, when applied to OECD data, resoundingly reject debt neu- 
trality. These two tests are then incorporated in an empirical version 
of the theoretical model. The empirical global model that I obtain this 
way is unique in  several aspects. 
It has a tightly focused structure, designed around questions con- 
cerning the impact of fiscal policy measures and interventions in com- 
modity trade  on intertemporal and intratemporal trade patterns  and 
relative  prices.  The global general-equilibrium  structure is a distin- 
guishing feature of the model, with the real interest rate and the struc- 
ture of the terms of trade resulting from global current account balance 
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that sets this model apart from all other empirical macromodels is its 
explicit incorporation of aggregate supply considerations. At the core 
of the industrial countries block, finally, is an explicit analysis of the 
interaction between private and public savings. 
In the applied part of the paper, I first present data demonstrating 
that government revenues net of Social Security outlays have remained 
remarkably constant as a share of national income from 1965 right up 
to  1984. This suggests that the fiscal policy debate has focused too 
much on tax cuts and has not paid enough attention to what was really 
going on, a major OECD-wide, deficit-financed, increase in government 
expenditure. I then assess the effect of this deficit-financed increase in 
real government expenditure on real interest rates by running a sim- 
ulation with the empirical model presented earlier, under the assump- 
tion of a halving of that increase in government expenditure. 
The results show, first of all, that fiscal policy explains only a neg- 
ligible fraction of the rapid increase in real interest rates between 1979 
and 1982. However, from 1982 almost all of the increase in real interest 
rates  can be  ascribed to the pressure  on  world  savings exerted  by 
increased fiscal expenditure and the fact that that increase was deficit 
financed. 
In section 8.6  I discuss various trade interventions designed to reduce 
fiscal deficits. I point out, and document empirically through simulation 
runs, the importance of interactions between intertemporal and intra- 
temporal trade. A tariff directed against LDC exports (along the line 
of proposals currently under discussion in the U.S. Congress) is shown 
to significantly deteriorate the LDC terms of trade. This in turn leads 
to a  significant ex  ante deterioration of  the  LDCs’ current account 
without an offsetting ex unfe improvement in the OECD current ac- 
count. The net result is an increase in the world interest rate to restore 
global current account balance, a possibility that I already pointed out 
in  the theoretical section. The simulation exercise demonstrates the 
empirical importance  of  this mechanism:  After imposition of  a 10% 
tariff against LDC exports, real interest rates rise a full 2 percentage 
points  initially. They are still 0.5 percentage point  higher after five 
years. Protectionism directed against LDCs, therefore, not only shifts 
their intratemporal terms of  trade unfavorably, but  it  also causes a 
deterioration of their intertemporal terms of trade. 
Applying tariff revenues against the public sector deficit rather than 
handing them out to consumers is shown not to reverse these results, 
although  there is a slight moderation in  the interest rate effect  (0.5 
percentage point). This moderation does not affect the basic message, 
that trade taxes will exacerbate the LDC transfer problem to such an 
extent that interest rates will actually increase, the deficit reduction 
notwithstanding. 298  Sweder van Wijnbergen 
Appendix 
List of  Variables 
All  real  variables  are in terms of industrial  countries’ goods unless 
























Real expenditure on industrial countries’ goods by de- 
veloping countries. 
Real expenditure on industrial countries’ goods by in- 
dustrial countries. 
Real  expenditure  on  industrial  countries’  goods  by 
OPEC. 
Real total expenditure by developing countries. 
Real total expenditure by industrial countries. 
Real total expenditure by OPEC. 
Real world current account discrepancy. 
Real current account balance of developing countries, 
corrected  for capital losses on net foreign assets,  in 
terms of developing countries’ goods. 
Real current account balance of  industrial  countries, 
corrected for capital losses on net foreign assets. 
Real current account balance of OPEC, corrected for 
capital losses on net foreign assets. 
Real consumption of physical capital in the industrial 
countries. 
Real private consumption expenditure in the industrial 
countries. 
Real  total  consumption  expenditure  in  developing 
countries. 
Real  private  consumption  expenditure  in  industrial 
countries. 
Real total government debt 
Real government consumption in industrial countries. 
Real government expenditure on goods and services in 
industrial countries. 
Real total gross fixed capital formation in developing 
countries. 
Real  total  gross fixed  capital formation  in  industrial 
countries. 
Real stock of physical capital in developing countries. 
Real stock of physical capital in industrial countries. 















Real net foreign assets of industrial countries. 
Real net foreign assets of OPEC. 
Real total government budget surplus in the OECD cor- 
rected for inflationary erosion of the public debt. 
Relative price of industrial countries’ goods in terms of 
developing countries’ goods. Base year 1980. 
Relative  price  of oil  in  terms  of industrial  countries’ 
goods. 
Own real rate of interest on developing countries’ goods. 
Own real rate of interest on industrial countries’ goods. 
Real government revenue minus transfer payments in 
industrial countries. 
Standardized unemployment rate in industrial countries 
(OECD definition). 
Real  wage in  terms  of  industrial  countries’ goods  in 
industrial countries. 
Real net national income in industrial countries. 
Real gross domestic product in developing countries. 
Real gross domestic product in industrial countries. 
Real gross domestic product in OPEC. 
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Comment  Guillermo A. Calvo 
This  paper provides  a  framework for the analysis  of  the impact of 
certain key macro policy measures on world equilibrium. In contrast 
with much of the earlier work in this area, an attempt is made to  ground 
some of  the equations on standard micro theory. I think we should be 
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thankful to the author for undertaking such an ambitious and coura- 
geous enterprise. 
From the point of view of economic substance, the paper tackles 
two sets of problems that turn out to be rather independent from one 
another. In the first part of the paper, a great deal of emphasis is put 
on disproving the empirical significance of the Ricardian equivalence 
proposition. The last part of the paper, on the other hand, focuses on 
simulations where government expenditure, not deficit, takes center 
stage. 
The test of Ricardian equivalence is based on a model where such 
an equivalence would fail if and only if the government faces a different 
“discount  rate”  than  the  public.  In  the  formal  presentation  of  the 
model, the analysis proceeds along the purest canons of micro-perfect- 
foresight  analysis.  However, the empirical  implementation  assumes 
that future expected government expenditure, for example, is a weighted 
average of present and past levels of government expenditure. Thus, 
in the paper’s notation, g is determined by G (including its past history). 
Since individuals are assumed to be keenly aware of the government’s 
budget constraint, we have 
(1)  T + tit = G + 6g. 
Hence, given G, a fall in  T, say, is expected to give rise to a future 
rise in t of an exactly equal (present value) magnitude. In other words, 
the paper assumes that all changes in taxes are transitory, unless they 
are accompanied by a contemporaneous change in G. This assumption 
will certainly sound extreme to some advocates of  the Reagan “tax 
cuts,” since some of them viewed these cuts as a way to induce Con- 
gress to put a lid on government expenditure. (Judd 1985 studies the 
effect of this sequence of events.) 
Let us consider a slight generalization of the paper’s assumption in 
which changes in expected future (present value) taxes per unit change 
of present taxes is > -  1. This means, by equation (l), that, given G, 
expected government expenditure, g, is an increasing function of (T- 0, 
implying that a test like the one in this paper, where expected govern- 
ment expenditure is a function of its lagged values, and not of present 
taxes, will show a positive response of consumption to a fiscal deficit. 
The reason is simple: lower taxes today are a signal that future gov- 
ernment expenditure will be lower. In this context, therefore, the find- 
ing that aggregate consumption responds to taxes could not be claimed 
to be a “proof” that there is a discrepancy between the discount rates 
faced by the government and the private sectors. 
In sum, the paper presents a test of the Ricardian proposition con- 
ditional on the assumption that changes in taxes are purely transitory. 
Any departure from this rather extreme case would put the paper’s 
results into question. In this respect, it would perhaps be instructive 302  Sweder van Wijnbergen 
to allow for the possibility that expected government expenditure be 
a function of current taxes, and then carry out a test similar to that in 
the paper.  If  it  is shown that taxes play a role in  determining  con- 
sumption, independent of the one they may have in forecasting future 
government expenditure, then the kind of doubts raised by my previous 
comments could be put to rest very quickly. 
I think the paper would be greatly improved by being more explicit 
about the underlying theoretical apparatus. I found it particularly an- 
noying that there is no reference to capital-mobility assumptions, not 
even a cursory remark on the type of assets available to the different 
agents around the world. I tried to infer the financial structure from 
the other assumptions of the model, but that turns out to be also very 
confusing. For example, van Wijnbergen’s equation (14) implies that 
the OECD’s “rate of interest” is also relevant for consumption deci- 
sions in the LDCs; does this imply perfect capital mobility? If so, what 
determines the geographical allocation of physical capital? Adjustment 
costs? If so, there will normally be cross-equation restrictions between 
the consumption and investment equations, or between the consump- 
tion and current account equations, and so forth. However, the paper 
imposes no cross-equation restriction in this respect, so we are back 
to square one. 
In addition, some of the parts which are more explicitly modeled 
would benefit from a more thorough discussion. For example, it would 
be  useful to know the theory  behind  the assumption that  the  con- 
sumption function contains lagged consumption as an explanatory vari- 
able in the empirical implementation of the model (e.g.,  sec. 8.4.1). 
This is so,  because not every justification for such an assumption is 
going to imply structural stability to regime changes. Hall (1978) is an 
example of a theory that would rationalize the presence of lagged con- 
sumption, but which will not support the hypothesis that the equation’s 
parameters are invariant to regime changes. 
To summarize, I think the paper is useful in that it attempts to explain 
the facts from a true general equilibrium perspective. From this point 
of view, keeping good track of  accounting identities is already an im- 
portant step forward. I am much less certain, however, that-beyond 
making use of those identities-the  paper exploits the constraints of 
the theory. This is not necessarily a reprehensible feature of the paper, 
but it suggests that the credibility of the results would be enhanced if 
the simulations were carried out in terms of several alternative empir- 
ical models. 
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Comment  John T.  Cuddington 
The objective of Sweder van Wijnbergen’s paper (henceforth Sweder), 
like the Knight and Masson (KM) paper (chap. 2, this volume), is to 
determine the extent to which the very high real interest rates since 
1979  can be  explained  by  expansionary fiscal policies in  the major 
industrial countries. The empirical models in the two papers differ in 
perhaps predictable ways, given the authors’ respective employers. 
Sweder’s model disaggregates the world into three regions: OECD, 
OPEC, and LDCs, whereas the KM model adopts a four-region break- 
down into the United States, Germany, Japan, and the rest of the world. 
The appropriateness of the two disaggregations, of course, depends on 
the purpose to which the models will be put. For some purposes, the 
KM approach of lumping together the world’s biggest debtor coun- 
tries-the  non-oil LDCs-and  the oil exporters, which have at times 
during in the 1970s been large international creditor countries, may be 
misleading. Similarly, aggregating all of  OECD together,  as Sweder 
does, has the disadvantage of implying that the United States and Japan 
can be treated as a single economic entity. 
It seems unlikely that income redistribution among the OECD coun- 
tries can be ignored, and many important policy problems in recent 
years have involved the mix of monetary and fiscal policies among the 
OECD nations. The last section of Sweder’s paper, for example, con- 
siders a recent proposal to reduce the U.S. fiscal deficit by  imposing 
an across-the-board import surcharge. This policy cannot really  be 
satisfactorily analyzed in a model that lumps all of the OECD together, 
for this implies that the import surcharge is really a uniform surcharge 
levied by all of OECD against all imports from OPEC and the devel- 
oping countries.  Presumably  this is far from what proponents of an 
import surcharge to reduce the U.S. fiscal deficit had in mind. Some 
advocate a tax on total imports of oil, or total domestic consumption 
of oil (whether produced in the United States or abroad). Others seem 
to have in mind a U.S.  import surcharge on imports from other in- 
dustrial countries, especially Japan in light of its large bilateral surplus 
vis-a-vis the United States. In any event, a tariff on imports from LDCs 
is (hopefully) a nonstarter, given their need to increase imports in order 
to service their large foreign debts. 
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Due to the degree of  aggregation employed, therefore,  I interpret 
Sweder’s analysis in  section 8.6 as an empirical demonstration and 
assessment of the general principle that there can be important inter- 
actions between interventions in intratemporal trade (via tariffs, quo- 
tas, etc.) and intertemporal trade. Specifically, trade taxes can have 
important effects on the real interest rate. In Sweder’s model, OECD 
tariffs on LDC and OPEC imports drive up the world interest rate, 
thereby inflicting a double “whammy”  on LDCs: Not only does this 
policy turn the intratemporal terms of trade against them, it also wors- 
ens their intertemporal terms of trade (i.e., drives up world interest 
rates thereby worsening their debt burden). I think this lesson is an 
important one, and one that would be robust to more country-disag- 
gregation in the model. 
An important contribution in  Sweder’s paper is an interesting dis- 
cussion of the facts regarding the stance of fiscal policy in the OECD 
countries in the early 1980s. He claims that the fiscal deficit of OECD 
“correctly  measured”  has increased sharply since 1981. Three mea- 
surement issues are addressed. The first involves the importance of 
correcting the deficit for the effect of inflation on the real value of the 
outstanding public debt. The second is the appropriateness of cyclically 
adjusting the deficit. The third is the importance of compositional ef- 
fects, that is, whether expenditure or revenue changes are most im- 
portant when analyzing changes in the fiscal deficit. 
Regarding the first point, the data in table 8.1 show the inflation- 
adjusted budget surplus/deficit for the nine large industrial countries. 
Their combined fiscal position moved from a small surplus of 0.6% of 
national income in 1981 to a deficit that peaked at 2.7% in  1983. Con- 
trary to widespread opinion, the growing deficit in  the United States 
has not been “more or less”  offset by surpluses in the remaining in- 
dustrial countries. Hence, the hypothesis that large fiscal deficits in the 
OECD countries  was  a  major  cause  of  the high  real  interest  rates 
cannot-on the basis of this evidence, at least-be  rejected out of hand. 
While I have no argument with inflation-adjusted measures of the 
fiscal deficit when trying to assess the macroeconomic effects of def- 
icits, it is difficult to say much about the causal link between fiscal 
deficits and real interest rates by just comparing the two time series. 
Thus, it is essential to go beyond causal empiricism to a model-based 
analysis of  the sort undertaken by  Sweder or KM. One of  the main 
reasons for the fiscal deterioration in the early  1980s, shown in table 
8.1, was  the disinflationary  policy being pursued, especially  in  the 
United States. Although inflation came down, nominal interest rates 
fell only slowly; hence, real rates rose sharply. This causes real interest 
payments on government long-term (fixed nominal interest rate) debt 
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fiscal deficit is, at least to some extent, just an endogenous response 
of the deficit to fluctuations in the real interest rate. It need not reflect 
a change in the tightness or looseness of fiscal policy. 
This leads to a second point about the appropriateness of using a 
cyclically adjusted or “full employment” measure of the deficit. Sweder 
rejects the use of cyclically adjusted measures on the grounds that it 
is the actual deficit, not the level of  the deficit would have prevailed 
had the economy been at full employment, that determines the pressure 
that fiscal deficits exert in the credit markets. I do not find this argument 
convincing. The importance of cyclical adjustment is to get a measure 
of  policy-induced changes in  fiscal stance,  rather  than  endogenous 
changes that result from business cycle fluctuations. Many analysts 
use cyclically adjusted deficits as a shortcut, rather than undertaking 
a general equilibrium analysis. The simulation part of Sweder’s paper 
is an example of this more complete approach. It models the effect of 
government spending, not  the  endogenous fiscal deficit,  on private 
saving and investment behavior (with the latter two depending on in- 
come, if  not the cyclical position of  the economy). 
The final measurement issue involves the different components of 
the government budget that give rise to the deficit. Sweder argues that 
transfer  payments  are, from a macroeconomic point  of  view, more 
appropriately treated as negative taxes than expenditures. When out- 
lays on Social Security are netted out against taxes, he finds that net 
taxes remained  remarkably  stable over the last 20 years right up to 
1984. “The big increase in deficits is due to a substantial increase in 
government expenditure on goods and services; as a share of national 
income, government expenditure on goods and services increased by 
a full 3 percentage points” (section 8.5.1).  This fact is important when 
trying to understand the role of growing OECD fiscal deficits in the 
macroeconomy of  the early  1980s. More importantly, it brings out a 
point that all economists know but frequently ignore, namely the mac- 
roeconomic  effects  of  deficits depend  critically  on how  they  arise. 
Increases in government spending and reductions in tax revenue col- 
lections both increase the fiscal deficit, yet their macro effects can be 
quite different. This is true in simple textbook Keynesian models; it is 
also true in neoclassical models with Barro-Ricardian debt neutrality. 
At the empirical level, it would be worthwhile to test whether transfer 
payments can, in fact, be treated as if  they are just negative taxes. 
Even in the national context, the differing income distribution effects 
from transfers and taxes may or may not cause them to have different 
macro implications. In a model that nets all transfers within the OECD 
against all tax revenue, the netting of taxes and transfers is likely to 
be even less credible. A related issue is whether or not to treat interest 
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interest payments-as  transfer payments. This is, in fact, the way that 
they are recorded in the U.S. national income accounts, although many 
other countries account for them as factor payments (just as private 
interest payments are recorded). In sum, there are a number of neu- 
trality or equivalence propositions involving the various components 
that comprise the budget deficit. A useful empirical exercise would be 
to test them, thereby providing some guidance regarding appropriate 
degrees of aggregation in medium-size, macro-simulation models. 
The last half of the paper uses an empirically estimated simulation 
model to analyze the effect on the real interest rate of cutting the growth 
rate for government current expenditures in half, so that it rises from 
22% to 23.5% of GDP rather than to 25%-the  actual increase over the 
1979-84  period. The model assumes that the real interest rate is de- 
termined in a perfectly integrated world capital market. This assump- 
tion undoubtedly overstates the extent to which developing countries 
could borrow during the late  1970s. Nevertheless, it is admittedly a 
tractable  one.  Each region specializes in  the production of  its own 
production good, as in the Mundell-Fleming model, and debt nonneu- 
trality in the OECD segment of the model is motivated by a Blanchard 
interest wedge story, which assumes that the private rate of interest 
exceeds the government rate because private agents face a constant 
probability of death whereas the government does not. 
Although the analytical model in  the early sections of the paper is 
an excellent example of a model that pays careful attention to inter- 
temporal considerations, the empirical model looks quite conventional 
(i.e., ad hoc in terms of its intertemporal underpinnings). Consumption, 
for example, depends on current income, future income having been 
solved out using the Koyck specification employed in early work by 
Friedman. There is no attempt to use a forward-looking rational ex- 
pectations specification in order to explicitly incorporate future income 
or taxes into consumption decisions. In fact, no expectational variables 
enter the model. To some extent this reflects the nonmonetary nature 
of the model. In future work along these lines, a more detailed treatment 
of expectational and monetary factors would be worth pursuing. 
How well does the model explain the sharp rise in the real interest 
rate  between  1980 and  1981, which is shown in figure 8.3? Sweder 
answers this question by asking: How much lower would the time path 
of interest rates have been during 1979-84  if  the increase in the ratio 
of government expenditure to GDP was cut in half (as described above)? 
The simulated effect on interest rates is shown as the dotted line in 
figure 8.3. I conclude from this figure that the rapid increase in gov- 
ernment spending can not explain why real interest rates rose sharply 
to 15% in  1980-81.  Rates are virtually  unchanged  in the simulation 
where government expenditure grows more slowly. The exercise, how- 307  Fiscal Policy, Trade Intervention, and World Interest Rates 
ever, does suggest that real interest rates would have come down much 
more quickly in  1981-84  if  government spending in the OECD, and 
especially in the United States, had been less expansionary. 
In short, the paper seems to provide a good explanation of why real 
interest rates stayed high in the early 1980s, but not how they got there 
in the first place. To  answer the latter question, I suspect that shifts in 
monetary policy in the OECD and the very rapid erosion of OPEC’s 
current account surplus after the second oil price hike (unlike its be- 
havior after the 1973-74 price increase) played an important role. Ex- 
pectations in 1979-80  of worsening fiscal deficits in the years ahead 
may also be an explanation, albeit one that is difficult to put to the 
empirical test. Needless to say, all of this is beyond the scope of the 
present paper. It does an admirable  job  of demonstrating the importance 
of  international repercussions of  fiscal expansion in  a multicountry, 
intertemporal, equilibrium framework. This Page Intentionally Left Blank